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The Ethics of Privacy Protection 
James H. Moor 
ABSTRACT 
THECONCEPT OF PRIVACY is a widely accepted legal and moral notion 
but has uncertain legal and philosophical foundations. Prominent 
legal accounts, such as the nonintrusion theory and the freedom 
to act theory, are inadequate. The control of information theory and 
the undocumented personal knowledge theory are philosophically 
better accounts but are open to counterexamples. A restricted access 
theory of privacy is developed and defended. 
INTRODUCTION 
The right to privacy is widely acknowledged and well-supported 
in the United States. Many familiar legal and ethical arguments pivot 
on an appeal to the right to privacy. A charge that a government, 
a corporation, or an individual has invaded someone's privacy is 
regarded as a serious matter. The concept of privacy seems so obvious, 
so basic, and so much a part of American values, that there may 
seem to be little room for any philosophical misgivings about it. 
However, substantial philosophical controversy about the nature of 
privacy exists. The philosophical debate focuses largely on two major 
questions: What is privacy? and Can the right to privacy be 
philosophically justified? 
Given the considerable role that privacy plays in moral and legal 
argumentation, one might expect that assertions about the right to 
privacy are emblazoned in a prominent position in the earliest 
philosophical and legal documents of our nation. However, the right 
to privacy is not explicitly mentioned or clearly discussed in the 
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Declaration of Independence or the Constitution of the United States. 
The Declaration of Independence lists some well-known inalienable 
rights such as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, but it does 
not mention privacy. The only hint of a concern for privacy occurs 
in the document when the signers mentioned grievances against the 
king such as sending “swarms of Officers to harass our people, and 
eat out their substance.” Of course, i t  is understandable that privacy 
is not discussed in the Declaration of Independence, for the primary 
purpose of this document was, after all, to declare independence and 
not to provide a thorough and well-reasoned philosophical account 
of human rights. 
What is surprising is that privacy is not explicitly mentioned 
in the Constitution of the United States. There are parts of the 
Constitution that support conceptions of privacy. For example, the 
Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue but upon probable cause....” This amendment provides 
important protection of individuals from government interference 
and surveillance, but it is far from a general statement of the right 
to privacy. Aspects of privacy are supported in other amendments. 
The First Amendment grants the right to peaceably assemble, the 
Fifth Amendment grants a right against self-incrimination, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from abridging the rights 
of citizens of the United States. But, all things considered, neither 
the Declaration of Independence nor the Constitution provides a clear 
philosophical conception of, or even a solid legal foundation for, 
the right to privacy. 
PHILOSOPHICAL OF SOMELEGALCRITIQUE 
CONCEPTIONSOF PRIVACY 
The concept of privacy has played a large role in legal discussions 
and judgments during the last century. Unfortunately, much of the 
legal work on privacy is either too eclectic, such as William Prosser’s 
(1960) historic list of the various kinds of privacy cases, or too narrowly 
focused, such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 and the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, to be philosophically 
revealing. However, some of the classic legal accounts of privacy are 
truly philosophically inspired. Here, attention will be directed to 
the two legal landmarks on privacy that are philosophically richest. 
Privacy as Nonintrusion 
In their famous 1890 Harvard Law Review article, Samuel Warren 
and Louis Brandeis provided a sensible analysis and evolutionary 
justification for the right to privacy. They argued that privacy was 
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an emerging right that needed to be recognized. They claimed that 
common law is not static but undergoes continuing growth as culture 
develops. As they put it: “Political, social, and economic changes 
entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its 
eternal youth grows to meet the demands of society” (p. 75).  This 
was a century ago, and some rather intimidating technology had 
been developed. The distrusted technology then was not the dreaded 
computer but the insidious camera: 
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step 
which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing 
to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right “to be let alone.” 
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the 
sacred precincts of private domestic life; and numerous mechanical 
devices threaten to make good the prediction that “what is whispered 
in the closet shall be proclaimed from the housetops.” (p. 76) 
For Warren and Brandeis (1984)the right to privacy was not something 
that is found by squinting at the Constitution but by admitting that 
cultural values and new technology play a large role in developing 
new understandings of our rights. They assigned great significance 
to this new right of privacy and treated a violation of privacy as 
a harm worse than some physical injury: 
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing 
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and 
man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive 
to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential 
to the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through 
invasion upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, 
far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury. (p. 77) 
Warren and Brandeis regarded the violation of a person’s privacy 
as a kind of spiritual harm that should be addressed by the law and 
could not be addressed by then existing laws that focused on material 
damages. 
Though their article is ground breaking and insightful, Warren 
and Brandeis do not provide a clear and explicit account of privacy. 
They cite Judge Cooley’s remark that it is right to be let alone, but 
privacy so analyzed seems both too broad and too narrow to count 
as a successful definition. On the one hand if A approaches B on 
a public street and A asks B what time it is, A has not let B alone 
but neither has A invaded B’s privacy. Striking up a normal 
conversation on a public street is not regarded by most as an invasion 
of privacy. On the other hand, if unknown to B and without B’s 
permission, A looks through B’s personal files, then A has invaded 
B S  privacy, but, strictly speaking, A has let B alone. It is uncertain 
whether Warren and Brandeis thought that actual publication of 
information was required in order to have an invasion of privacy. 
They were concerned, of course, about preventing the publication 
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of gossip. But, in some situations simple eavesdropping without any 
thought of publication is a clear invasion of privacy. Therefore, the 
specific publication of information or passing i t  along in other forms 
is not a necessary condition for an invasion of privacy. 
Privacy as Freedom to Act 
Another philosophical conception of privacy is deeply embedded in 
constitutional law as i t  has developed during the last quarter of a 
century. Privacy is understood in this context as liberty or freedom 
to act in personal matters. The relevant cases considered by the courts 
usually have been about sexual and reproductive freedoms. The most 
famous case in this regard is, perhaps, Roe v. Wade in which a woman’s 
right to have an abortion was successfully argued on the grounds 
of privacy. To understand better how the concept of privacy is 
philosophically connected in constitutional law with sexual and 
reproductive freedoms, i t  is useful to look at the 1965 landmark case 
Griswold u. Connecticut in some detail. In this historic case the 
appellants were Griswold, the executive director of the Planned 
Parenthood League of Connecticut, and Buxton, a licensed physician 
who was the me lca l  director for the league at its center in New 
Haven, Connecticut. They gave married couples advice on preventing 
conception. Fees were normally charged for their services which 
included medical exams and dispensing information about 
contraception and related materials. Their activity was in direct 
conflict with the General Statutes of Connecticut. In §§ 53-32: 
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the 
purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than f i f ty  dollars 
or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be 
both fined and imprisoned. 
And in 54-196: 
Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands 
another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if 
he were the principal offender. 
The appellants to the Supreme Court had been found guilty under 
the Connecticut Statutes and had been fined $100 each. Justice 
Douglas, who was philosophically inclined, wrote for the majority 
opinion that overturned the Connecticut statute. Douglas believed 
that privacy is grounded by the Constitution. He said: “[Slpecific 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by 
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and 
substance.... Various guarantees create zones of privacy.” Douglas 
asked rhetorically: “Would we allow the police to search the sacred 
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of 
contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy 
surrounding the marriage relationship” (Grey, 1983, p. 43). Douglas 
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perceived the right of privacy with regard to the marital relationship 
as a deep cultural right predating the Constitution. He proclaimed: 
“We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights- 
older than our political parties, older than our school system.” 
The other justices who agreed with Douglas’s opinion disagreed 
with his justification. Justice Goldberg agreed that: “Connecticut’s 
birth-control law unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of 
marital privacy” but he argued that i t  is the Ninth Amendment that 
guarantees such privacy. The Ninth Amendment says that the other 
amendments do not exhaust the basic and fundamental rights of the 
people. The Ninth Amendment is a catchall amendment originally 
put forward by James Madison. Madison’s purpose in proposing this 
amendment was to satisfy those who were concerned that no bill 
of rights would be broad enough to specifically enumerate all essential 
rights and that those rights not specifically mentioned might be 
interpreted as being denied. Justice Harlan, who agreed with 
Douglas’s opinion, offered still another interpretation. Harlan agreed 
that the Connecticut statute was an unjustifiable invasion of privacy 
but appealed to the Fourteenth Amendment for support. Specifically, 
Harlan believed the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was the appropriate basis for overturning the Connecticut statute. 
The due process clause has never been given a clear elaboration and 
it is far from a formula, but roughly the clause has been used to 
protect a wide range of liberties and Harlan maintained, as Justice 
White did as well, that the freedom of a husband and wife to use 
contraceptives is a liberty which requires such protection. 
In light of Griswold u. Connecticut, what should we conclude 
philosophically about the right to privacy? This case demonstrates 
that any constitutional guarantees to the right to privacy depend 
a lot on the eyes of the beholder. Justice Douglas saw privacy in 
the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, Justice Goldberg saw i t  in the 
Ninth Amendment, and Justice Harlan saw it covered by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The problem with this 
kind of defense of the right to privacy is that some may not see 
it at all. Justice Black, while agreeing with the majority that the 
Connecticut law was offensive, said in his dissenting opinion: “The 
Court talks about a constitutional ‘right of privacy’ as though there 
is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any laws 
ever to be passed which might abridge the ‘privacy’ of individuals. 
But there is not.” 
The Griswold decision rests on an even deeper confusion of the 
concept of privacy with the concept of liberty. The real issue in 
Griswold u. Connecticut is the question of whether a married couple 
should have the freedom to obtain information about contraception 
and to use contraceptive methods. All of the constitutional arguments 
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about privacy in this case can be replaced with arguments about 
contraceptive liberty. This liberty can be placed in the penumbra 
of the Bill of Rights or included in the protection of the Ninth 
Amendment, or covered by due process stated in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Or one might hold that the issue of contraception isn’t 
a constitutional matter at all, and that the people of Connecticut 
should persuade their legislators to repeal such an asinine law. But 
on any of these views the issue remains a question of liberty. Ironically, 
the state of Connecticut could never have enforced this law if i t  were 
violated privately. It was only the public flaunting of the law that 
gave rise to the court case. 
The separation of the concept ‘of privacy from the concept of 
liberty is important because we do not want the right to privacy 
to become a screen to protect truly harmful actions. A married couple, 
A and B, should have a right to privacy, but their privacy does not 
give A the freedom to beat B or B the liberty to poison A or A 
and B the right to torture their children. Distinguishing privacy from 
particular freedoms allows us to argue for privacy without licensing 
abuse. A common motivation for citing privacy in cases like Griswold 
is to protect individuals against intrusive laws for victimless crimes. 
As important as this may be, the conflation of personal freedoms 
with privacy only confuses the discussions of both and can put the 
defense of the important right of privacy in the service of protecting 
violent crimes. 
A PHILOSOPHICALLOOKAT THE CONCEPTOF PRIVACY 
The concept of privacy has been analyzed extensively by 
contemporary philosophers. Philosophers, like everyone, have been 
struck by the broad dissemination and the forceful impact of 
information technology during the last few decades. Therefore, i t  
is not surprising that most contemporary philosophical accounts of 
privacy tie it closely to the concept of information. 
Privacy as Control of Information 
Priuacy is frequently defined in terms of control of information. 
For example, Charles Fried (1984) states: “Privacy is not simply an 
absence of information about us in the minds of others, rather it 
is the control we have over information about ourselves” (p. 209). 
Alan Westin (1967) says that privacy is the claim that individuals 
and groups determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others. Elizabeth 
Beardsley (1971) suggests that persons have the right to decide when 
and how much information about themselves will be revealed to others 
(P. 65).  
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Although control of information is clearly an aspect of privacy, 
these definitions emphasizing control are inadequate for there are 
many situations in which people have no control over the exchange 
of personal information about themselves but in which there is no 
loss of privacy. Consider some examples. A can tell B widely known 
personal information about C in a situation in which C has no control 
but in which C suffers no loss of privacy. For instance, in normal 
situations, A can tell B C’s name or where C lives or that C likes 
the Boston Celtics without diminishing C’s privacy. Moreover, if 
control is construed to mean direct, personal control of information, 
then on the control theory of privacy we are giving up privacy 
whenever we tell anyone anything about ourselves if there is no direct 
control over what the other person will do with the information. 
This seems at best counterintuitive. For instance, personal 
information confided to a doctor will be passed on to other doctors 
and to nurses in normal medical practice beyond a patient’s control 
and yet without any invasion of the patient’s privacy. Furthermore, 
because personal information about us is stored in computer 
databases, most of us have no control over how that stored information 
is used. Of course, these data banks are a potential threat to privacy 
if the stored information is improperly released. However, if the 
information in these databases is properly used or, even more clearly, 
not used at all, then privacy is not diminished by the simple lack 
of control over that information. For these reasons the very popular 
control theory of privacy is not an adequate conception of privacy. 
Privacy as Undocumented Personal Knowledge 
An interesting definition of privacy involving information has 
been proposed by W.A. Parent (1983). Parent states: “[Plrivacy is the 
condition of a person’s not having undocumented personal 
information about himself known by others” (p. 346). Parent 
maintains that “personal information” properly refers to facts that 
most people in a given society choose not to reveal about themselves 
(except to friends, family, advisors, etc.) or to facts about which a 
particular person is extremely sensitive and which he therefore does 
not choose to reveal about himself” (pp. 346-47). Parent explains 
that height may be personal information for someone who is ultra- 
sensitive about being short and who tries desperately to conceal his 
actual height even from his closest friends. Parent does not explain 
in detail what counts as undocumented personal information but 
gives as an example of documented information an item in an old 
newspaper. Thus, according to Parent, if A finds out by browsing 
through an old newspaper that B was a convicted felon, then A has 
not invaded B’s privacy for this information is documented. 
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Parent’s definition of privacy focuses on the content of 
information, not the control of information. As a result, his definition 
avoids some of the criticisms of the control theory of privacy. To 
criticize the control theory, Parent imagines a situation in which 
A has a fantastic X-ray device that allows A to look through walls. 
If A aims the machine at B’s house but doesn’t look through the 
machine, then A has deprived B of control of personal information 
but has not invaded B’s privacy (p. 344). In Parent’s example, A 
threatens B’s privacy but has not gained any undocumented personal 
information about B, and so on Parent’s account, B’s privacy remains 
intact. But there are other cases in which Parent’s undocumented 
personal knowledge theory fares less well than the control theory. 
Suppose while B is away from her personal computer, A uses i t  to 
call u p  B’s personal diary and lists the contents of the diary on the 
screen. Also suppose A is distracted so A does not read the screen 
and does not gather any undocumented personal knowledge of B. 
This surely seems to be a violation of B’s privacy and would be so 
classified by the control theory of privacy but not by the 
undocumented personal information theory. 
Parent’s personal information view not only misses some cases 
of privacy violations but also includes some cases which do not seem 
to be privacy violations at all. If in a public meeting A notices that 
B, who happens to be ultra-sensitive about his height, is wearing 
elevator shoes and A concludes that B is short, then A has gained 
some undocumented personal knowledge about B, but clearly A hasn’t 
invaded B’s privacy. If A learns from casual conversation a widely 
known, but undocumented fact that B is an alcoholic, then A has 
gained some undocumented personal knowledge about B,  but again 
A has not invaded B’s privacy. 
Priuacy as Restricted Access 
The conception of privacy that is most defensible is the 
conception of privacy in terms of restricted access. Anita Allen (1988), 
Ruth Gavison, and others have offered variations of restricted access 
definitions. The core idea of restricted access accounts is that privacy 
is a matter of the restricted access to persons or information about 
persons. 
By my definition, an individual or group has privacy in a situation 
if and only if in that situation the individual or group or information 
related to the individual or group is protected from intrusion, 
observation, and surveillance by others. The vague word situation 
was deliberately chosen with the intent that it would range over the 
kinds of states of affairs to which we normally attribute privacy. 
A situation may be an activity in a location such as living in one’s 
home, or a situation may be defined by a relationship such as a 
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lawyer/client relationship or a situation may be the storage and use 
of information related to people such as information contained in 
a computer database. The paradigm example of a private situation 
is a situation in which one is protected from the prying eyes of others. 
Private situations are islands of epistemological sanctuary. 
There are two kinds of private situations-naturally private and 
normatively private. Naturally private situations are situations in 
which people, because of the circumstances of the situation, are 
naturally protected from intrusion or information-gathering by 
others. Thus, if, for example, a family is alone hiking in the woods, 
they are in a naturally private situation. Nobody else is around and 
they are naturally protected by the forest from observation by others. 
Now, if a troop of girl scouts suddenly appears in the woods on 
the trail in front of this family, they lose their natural privacy. The 
girl scouts intrude and observe them. Of course, they are doing 
nothing wrong as they have every right to be there. A loss of natural 
privacy is not automatically an invasion of privacy. However, in 
addition to naturally private situations there are also normatively 
private situations. In normatively private situations the protection 
may be natural but is essentially legal or moral. In normatively private 
situations, some people (the outsiders) are morally or legally forbidden 
from intruding or gathering information about others (the insiders) 
who are allowed in the situation. Thus, if a family is enjoying a 
videotape in their home, they are in a normatively private, as well 
as a naturally private, situation. If a troop of girl scouts comes to 
a window of their house and the girl scouts secretly peer through 
the window to watch this family, privacy will be lost. Because in 
this situation there is normative protection, the family has a right 
to complain. The girl scouts are outsiders to the situation, and they 
have violated the right to privacy. The distinction between natural 
and normative privacy is crucial in defending a restricted access 
account. Not every situation in which one observes someone else 
or gathers information about someone else does or should count as 
a violation of privacy. When walking down a public street, one may 
give up some natural privacy but not normative privacy. 
Which situations are normatively private and which are not? 
One answer to this question is that the nature and kind of situations 
that are private is culturally determined. Obviously, cultures do vary 
about what is considered a (normatively) private situation and what 
is not. Moreover, the boundaries of private situations for one culture 
will likely change over time. However, another more complex, but 
equally true, answer to the question is that the nature and kind of 
situations which ought to be private is open to rational and moral 
argument. In general, privacy allows one to gain goods such as 
enhancing liberty and controlling personal development and to avoid 
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evils such as suffering psychological and economic losses. But, privacy 
is not an unalloyed good for it has its costs as well. One cost of 
privacy is that it makes social and political institutions less effective 
which in turn may be detrimental to individuals. For example, treating 
the use of medical records as a private situation will protect patients 
but may retard the general search for medical information by 
epidemiological researchers who would use such information to 
isolate the causes of diseases. 
The restricted access conception of privacy just discussed has 
advantages over the other conceptions of privacy without sharing 
their disadvantages. The key notion in this view of privacy is the 
concept of a private situation. Compare this concept with the notion 
of undocumented personal information in the following cases. On 
the one hand, suppose A is taking a shower at a public bath which 
has no shielding partitions for the bathers. Now B,  a member of 
the same sex, walks into the public bath. B suddenly gains a lot 
of undocumented personal knowledge about A,  and yet B has not 
invaded A’s privacy. In our culture this is a situation in which A 
is not protected from someone else of the same sex from making 
observations. If A has undocumented personal information A wishes 
to keep secret but which would be revealed by public showering, 
then A should shower in a more private situation. Of course B would 
invade A’s privacy if B came uninvited into A’s private bath at home 
to view A .  It is the situation that makes the difference in the judgment 
of privacy and not the kind of information. Consider another example. 
Suppose A ,  outside of B’s hotel room, looks through the keyhole 
at B. B is dressed and reading the evening newspaper. Here A is 
invading B’s privacy, for one’s hotel room is regarded, at least in 
this culture, as a private situation. It is not the undocumented personal 
information that A gains that matters. Indeed, it may be widely known 
and documented that B always reads the evening newspaper at that 
time in her hotel room. It is the unauthorized surveillance by A 
of a private situation that counts as the invasion of privacy. 
Control of information is important for privacy, but again i t  
is the notion of a private situation that makes the difference. Here 
is an example that contrasts the two theories. Suppose A confesses 
personal information to a priest B .  Though A has no control over 
what B will do with the information, confessions are regarded in 
this culture as a private situation. The loss of control does not entail 
any loss of privacy. Clearly, if the confessional moment had been 
recorded clandestinely by someone else, then there would have been 
an invasion of a private situation and a corresponding loss of privacy. 
The restricted access view of privacy clarifies some of the legal 
intuitions about privacy discussed earlier. The notion of a private 
situation is not unlike Douglas’s concept of a “zone of privacy.” A 
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normatively private situation, such as living in one’s home, fosters 
personal freedoms since insiders cannot be intimidated by the presence 
or observations of outsiders. Private situations give us zones of 
protection to do what we want to do within the limits of personal 
freedom. Again, note the crucial distinction between privacy and 
liberty. Privacy provides an umbrella under which to act freely, but 
there are limits. Child molesting, for instance, is not a freedom 
protected under the umbrella of privacy. Hence, although it is 
important not to conflate privacy with liberty, i t  is equally important 
not to underestimate the degree to which privacy, understood as 
normative private situations, provides a supportive environment for 
personal freedoms. 
Finally, the restricted access view is compatible with portions 
of the nonintrusion account. The restricted access view, as presented 
here, counts intrusions as violations of privacy only so long as they 
interrupt private situations. Intrusions on public streets are not 
invasions of privacy. But, unauthorized manipulations of computer 
databases by using personal computers and modems are intrusions 
into private situations, and therefore, these are invasions of privacy. 
Because invasions of privacy can involve more than intrusions, the 
restricted access view is more comprehensive than a simple 
nonintrusion account. 
A feature that is particularly attractive about the restricted access 
theory of privacy is that it gives technology the right kind of credit 
for enhancing privacy and the right kind of challenge for protecting 
privacy. Giving technology credit for enhancing privacy acknowl- 
edges that we owe a lot of privacy today to modern technology. 
Technology has generated the possibilities for many normatively 
private situations. This technology is so common that we take it, 
and its consequences for privacy, for granted. For instance, the 
technology for food production, distribution, and preservation 
enables us to be in private situations for extended periods of time. 
Central heating and better insulation allows rooms in houses and 
businesses to be enclosed and private. Modern water, power, and 
sanitation systems support lives of privacy. Even computer technology, 
which is often portrayed as the greatest threat to privacy, can enhance 
it. Withdrawing money from an automatic teller after banking hours 
is more private than talking to a human bank teller in the middle 
of the day. Without all of these modern technologies, our lives 
arguably would be much less private than they are now. 
The restricted access theory also suggests the right questions 
for keeping technology in check. As technology develops, we need 
to ask what kinds of restrictions should be put on the access to 
individuals and information about them in order to protect privacy. 
What kinds of restricted situations-zones of privacy-will give us 
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better lives? Rather than asking abstract questions about personal 
control of information or undocumented personal information, we 
should ask whether and how specific situations should have restricted 
access. For example, as library circulation records become more 
computerized, the resulting circulation databases ought to be regarded 
as zones of privacy. The issue is not whether a borrower should have 
control of his or her lending record in the database, but whether 
there is restricted access to the data so that borrowers feel the freedom 
to read what they please without scrutiny from the FBI or other 
outside organizations. One of the features of computers is that 
circulation records can be even more restricted than the traditional 
paper records. In a typical situation using computerized circulation 
records, a librarian need not have access to information about who 
has borrowed a particular item in the past. Computer technology 
can protect zones of privacy as well as invade them. 
Justi fying Priuacy 
Philosophers have offered a variety of justifications of privacy 
as an important value. Stanley Benn suggests that privacy is grounded 
in respect for persons. As Benn puts it: “To respect someone as a 
person is to concede that one ought to take account of the way in 
which his enterprise might be affected by one’s own decisions.” This 
type of justification for privacy is both popular and at least initially 
plausible. One problem with giving respect for persons as a 
justification for privacy is that it does not distinguish between times 
in which privacy is justified and times in which it is not. For instance, 
a mother might have respect for her baby as a person, conceding 
that she ought to take account of the way in which her baby’s enterprise 
might be affected by her own decisions and still not give her baby 
privacy. Now the mother might conclude that she will not give her 
baby any privacy just because she does respect her baby as a person! 
In general, A may have respect for B as a person and not grant her 
privacy, for A may conclude that, at least in certain circumstances 
i t  is in B’s best interest not to have privacy-e.g., A decides to save 
B’s life by rushing into her private home at night to save her from 
a fire. Respect for persons is at most a general background principle 
for justifying privacy and not a sufficient principle by itself for 
deducing the need for privacy in particular cases. 
Other philosophers have offered more straightforwardly 
instrumental justifications for privacy. Charles Fried (1984) says that 
privacy is necessary for love and friendship (pp. 207-09). James 
Rachaels (1984) suggests that privacy is needed to create diverse social 
relationships (p. 292). Deborah Johnson (1985) argues that privacy 
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increases personal autonomy (p. 67).All of these are certainly plausible 
justifications for privacy, for private situations do foster diverse kinds 
of relationships and autonomous decision making. 
These instrumental justifications of privacy are the overwhelm- 
ing philosophical favorites and may be adequate to ground the moral 
notion of privacy. However, I believe that for some people privacy 
may be valued intrinsically, that is, valued for its own sake. Of course, 
to claim that privacy may have intrinsic value is compatible with 
claiming that privacy is also instrumentally valuable. The possibility 
of intrinsic value is worth exploring. As a thought experiment, 
consider someone who has his entire life under surveillance by others. 
These others do not interfere with his life and he doesn’t know that 
the surveillance is taking place. In effect, all private situations for 
this person are invaded, but his life is no different with regard to 
making decisions and having diverse relationships than i t  would have 
been without the surveillance. The only thing different about his 
life under surveillance is that he has no privacy. This person seems 
morally wronged by the invasion of his privacy though no special 
harm comes to him other than the invasion of his privacy. This 
thought experiment suggests that privacy has an intrinsic justification 
as well as an instrumental one. If this is the case, then, philosophically 
speaking, privacy is that much more secure. 
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